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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Peter Brennan, pro se 1 , appeals

d

court's

summarily

dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings
The underlying facts of this case have been outlined by the Court of
Appeals in Brennan v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 767 (Idaho App.
Dec. 21, 2012):
Brennan pied guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen.
Idaho Code § 18-1508. An amended
judgment of conviction was entered on June 30, 2009, to correct a
clerical mistake in the original judgment. Brennan subsequently
filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district
court denied. Brennan did not appeal his original sentence or the
denial of his Rule 35 motion. On September 15, 2011, Brennan
filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was filed within one
year of the denial of his Rule 35 motion, but more than two years
after the entry of the amended judgment of conviction. Brennan's
post-conviction petition contained ineffective assistance of counsel
claims related to failure to file a suppression motion based upon
asserted Miranda violations and use of a psychosexual evaluation
at sentencing. The district court entered a notice of intent to
dismiss the petition, on the ground that the petition was untimely
and lacking any basis for equitable tolling of the one-year period for
filing the petition under I.C. § 19-4902. Brennan responded to the
court's notice of intent to dismiss, stating there was no time limit on
a successive petition for post-conviction relief. While Brennan
labeled his petition for post-conviction relief "successive," it was the

Although counsel was originally appointed to represent Brennan in this appeal,
the Court granted the SAPD's motion to withdraw. (10/16/13 Order Granting
Motion for Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend Briefing Schedule.) The SAPD's
request to withdraw as counsel was made following "a thorough review" by three
separate attorneys of the appellate record in this case who concluded "that the
appeal failed to present any meritorious issues for review, rendering the appeal
frivolous." (9/12/13 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw and
Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p.2.)
1

1

first petition for post-conviction relief, again stating the petition was
untimely and that no ground for equitable toiling had been
asserted.
*1, 2 (footnote omitted).

The district court's order summarily dismissing Brennan's petition as being
untimely filed was affirmed on appeal. !d. at *5.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
Brennan filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in May
of 2012. (R., pp.5-9.) In it, Brennan asserted ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to inform him of the denial of his Rule 35 notice and failure to file a
petition for post-petition relief. (R., p.6.) The state filed an answer to Brennan's
successive petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for summary dismissal
because "the court is not permitted to equitably toll the statute based on the
record." (R., p.32.)
The district court appointed post-conviction counsel and an amended
successive petition for post-conviction relief was filed alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to file a petition for post-conviction relief. (R.,
pp.40-42, 60-66.) The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal
of the amended successive petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.67-70.)

Brennan objected to the state's motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.94-99), to
which the state filed a reply asserting Brennan failed to articulate any basis for
equitable tolling of the time in which to file his successive petition for postconviction relief. (R., pp.100-101 ).

2

Following a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal, the court took

the matter under advisement, ultimately issuing a written memorandum decision
and

order summarily dismissing Brennan's successive petition for post-

conviction relief. (R., pp.103-107.)
Brennan timely appealed from the dismissal of his successive petition for
post-conviction relief. (R.. pp.110-113.)

3

ISSUE
Brennan states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court error [sic] by not tolling Mr. Brennan's limitations
period for fairness reasons, a concept known as equitable tolling?
(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Brennan failed to establish the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief?

4

ARGUMENT
Brennan Has Faiied To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court summarily dismissed Brennan's successive petition for
after concluding Brennan had failed to demonstrate a

sufficient basis for the equitable tolling of his successive petition for postconviction relief claims. (R., p.5.)
to

eq

On appeal, Brennan asserts he was entitled

tolling of the time period in

conviction relief.

ich

file his petition for post-

(See generally, Appellant's brief.)

Brennan has failed to

establish a valid basis for the equitable tolling of the time in which

file his

petition for post-conviction relief and has therefore failed to show error in the
district

B.

dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
_ _ , 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely

5

review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Dismissal Of Brennan's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
\/Vas Aporopriate Because It \/Vas Untimely Filed And Brennan Failed To
Allege Facts That, If True, Would Toll Application Of The Statute Of
Limitations
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding

and

the

petitioner bears the

burden

of establishing,

by

a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

Bi

(citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief.

Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979
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P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892
P .2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995).

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court

may dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it
appears that the appiicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, I.C. § 19-4906(c)
provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Brennan's petition as untimely.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

In the

case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007)).

In those circumstances, the court will apply a "reasonable

time" standard. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. "In determining
what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply
consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases."

7

Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. However, absent a showing by

the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to file a timely
petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Rhoades,
148 Idaho at 247, 220 P.3d at 1066.
The district court correctly concluded Brennan failed to establish that the

claims in his successive petition for post-conviction relief were raised in a
reasonabie period of time after he became aware of them:
The Court cannot conclude that Petitioner brought his claims
related to Mr. Sutton's representation of him within a reasonable
time after such claims were known to Petitioner. Petitioner asserts
that he became aware of Mr. Sutton's failure to file a petition for
post-conviction relief on his behalf in January of 2011. Petitioner
did not file his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief in the
case at bar until May 23, 2012, approximately sixteen months after
he discovered the facts giving rise to his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim against Mr. Sutton. While the issue of whether a
successive petition has been filed within a reasonable time should
be determined on a case--by-case basis, the Court notes that Idaho
appellate courts have generally concluded that a delay of over one
year is unreasonable, especially where the petitioner fails to
provide a sufficient reason for the delay.
Petitioner has not
provided a sufficient reason for the delay of approximately sixteen
months between the time he discovered Mr. Sutton's actions and
the time he filed the petition in the case at bar.
(R., p.106 (citations to the record and case citation omitted).)
Brennan unsuccessfully claims on appeal he is entitled to the benefit of
the "relation back or equitable tolling" doctrines.

(See generally Appellant's

brief.) The only three circumstances in which Idaho recognizes equitable tolling
are: (1) "where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an instate conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials,"
Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003). (2)

8

"where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner
incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his
conviction,"

&:

and (3) where there are '"claims which simply [were] not known

to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process issues,"'
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). Brennan
did not allege any of the foregoing bases as a reason to toll the limitation period
for filing his petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) As the district court found
in concluding Brennan had "effectively waived his claims related to Mr. Sutton":

the facts underlying Petitioner's claims related to Mr. Sutton were
discovered by Petitioner well before he filed his first petition for
post-conviction relief. Such claims were not raised by Petitioner in
his first petition, nor were they raised as a basis for equitable tolling
as to the timeliness of the first petition.
Petitioner has not
demonstrated sufficient reason why the issues raised in his
successive petition could not have been raised in the first petition.
(R., p.107,)
The district court correctly dismissed Brennan's successive petition for
post-conviction

relief on the ground that it did

not meet the statutory

requirements for a permissible successive petition under LC. § 19-4908.

9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfuliy requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Brennan's successive petition for post-conviction
relief.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of February 2014, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
PETER BRENNAN
Inmate# 93142
Idaho Correctional Center
~ 1
P.O. Box 7001.0
Boise, ID 8370\
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